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Keeping the Fox From Managing the
Henhouse: Why Incumbent Utilities
Should Not Be Allowed to Operate
the Distribution System Platform
James M. Van Nostrand*

industry in the United States, as local distribution
utility
the electric of
in penetration
underway
utilities
are facedis with
increased
distransformation
tributed generation resources, primarily solar photovoltaic
("PV") panels, thereby resulting in gradual abandonment of
the traditional model featuring large, centralized generating
stations. Regulators and industry observers refer to "the utility
of the future," which will involve a "customer-centric" business model where the utility's role will be to manage integration of distributed energy resources ("DERs") and facilitating
customer-driven energy choices such as energy efficiency and
demand response programs.! To a large extent, these changes
are driven by economics and advancing technology: the costs
of distributed energy resources, particularly solar PV panels, have declined considerably in recent years, resulting in
increased penetration of distributed energy resources and
corresponding reductions in electricity demand being placed
on the local utility, as customers "self-generat[e]" their power. 2 Improved and lower cost technology has also given utility customers an increased ability to exercise control of their
energy usage, through demand-side management ("DSM")
programs. 3 These measures, too, have the effect of reducing

the level of electricity sales from the local utility. The collective effect of these forces is to call into question the long-term
viability of the traditional electric utility business model. A
number of state regulatory commissions around the country
have proceedings to reformulate the utility business modeland the associated regulatory framework-in light of this
industry transformation.4
The most prominent "Utility 2.0" proceeding is Reforming the Energy Vision ("REV"), which is underway at the
New York Public Service Commission ("PSC"). In an order
issued in February 2015, the New York PSC adopted a new
utility business model that identified the foundational utility service as a "distribution system platform provider," or
DSP. 6 Under this approach, the DSP would be charged with
planning and designing its distribution system as a platform
to facilitate uniform market access to customers and distributed energy resource providers.7 In other words, the DSP's
role would be as the platform for interface among its customers, distributed energy providers, and the distribution
system, and the DSP would be expected to cease treating
distributed energy providers as competitors, but rather view
4.
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Herman K. Trabish, How to become the "Utility of the Future?" Industry experts
weigh in, UTILITY DIVE, Sept. 28, 2015, http://www.utilitydive.com/news/
how-to-become-the-utility-of-the-future-industry-experts-weigh-in/406125/.
ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST. ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF GRID DEFECTION:
WHEN AND WHERE DISTRIBUTED SOLAR GENERATION PLUS STORAGE COMPETES WITH TRADITIONAL UTILITY SERVICE
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9 (2014), http://www.rmi.org/

electricity-grid defection.
See Brandon Davito et al., The Smart Grid and the Promise of Demand-Side
Management, in McKINSEY ON SMART GRID 41 (2010), www.smartgrid.gov/
files/TheSmartGridPromiseDemandSideManagement_201003.pdf.
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See Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Order Instituting Rulemaking Regarding Policies,
Procedures and Rules for Development of Distribution Resources Plans Pursuant to Public Utilities Code Section 769, No. 14-08-013 (Aug. 20, 2014), http://
docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/GOOO/M103/K223/103223470.
pdf; Haw. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Regarding Integrated Resource Planning, No.
2012-0036, at 2 Ex. A (Apr. 28, 2014), http://dms.puc.hawaii.gov/dms/Do
cumentViewer?pid=A1001001A12CO2B22338C61198; Mass. Dept of Pub.
Util., Investigation by the Dep't of Pub. Util. on its own Motion Into Modernization of the Electric Grid, Order No. 12-76-B (June 12, 2014); N.Y.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Proceeding on Motion of the Commission in Regard to
Reforming the Energy Vision, No. 14-M-0101 (2014) [hereinafter REV MoTION], http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/MatterManagement/CaseMaster
4
aspx?MatterCaseNo= 1 -m-0 101; Energy Future Coal, Utility2.0: Piloting the
Futurefor Maryland' Electric Utilities and Their Customers (Mar. 2013), http://
www.smartgridinformation.info/pdf/5230_doc_1.pdf.
See REV MOTION, supra note 4.
N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Order Adopting Regulatory Policy Framework and
Implementation Plan, No. 14-M-0101, at 40 (Feb. 26, 2015) [hereinafter
TRACK ONE ORDER], http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/View-

Doc.aspx?DocRefld={0B599D87-445B-4197-9815-24C27623A6AO}.
Id. at 40-41.
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them as customers and partners. Adoption of a DSP model,
however, does not end the discussion; there is the further
issue of deciding whether the incumbent utility will become
the DSP, and how the "market power" issues associated with
that function (i.e., actions necessary to ensure that the platform is operated in a manner that promotes fair competition)
can be addressed. In its February 2015 order, the New York
PSC determined that the existing incumbent electric utilities
would serve as DSPs.8
Allowing the existing distribution utility to continue
to operate the distribution platform under this new utility
business model, however, may present a fundamental conflict of interest. If the DSP performs its intended function
by encouraging the expansion and optimization of customerowned distributed energy resources and promoting energy
efficiency and demand response programs, the result will
likely be a reduction in the need for the utility to make additional investments. In other words, the utility as DSP would
have strong motivation to increase its assets-the rate base
upon which it earns a return-rather than promote customer-owned distributed energy resources. In many respects,
this solution maybe far worse than the proverbial "fox guarding the henhouse." Assigning the incumbent utility with the
role as DSP may be more like the fox managingthe henhouse.
In many respects, this transformation at the state level
with respect to retail service in the electric industry mirrors
the experience at the federal level regarding wholesale electric
markets during the 1990s, when the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") issued a series of orders designed
to introduce competition into the generation market, by
requiring nondiscriminatory open access to the transmission
grid.9 FERC considered similar issues regarding the methods
for addressing the market power issues associated with the
incumbent utilities continuing to operate the transmission
network, and its approach evolved from one allowing the
incumbent utilities to continue to operate the transmission
network (Order 888, issued in 1996) to a model featuring
operation of the transmission network by an independent
third party (Order 2000, issued in 1999).o This evolution
of the wholesale electric markets at the federal level provides
considerable guidance to state regulators as they grapple
with the design of the utility business and regulatory model
for retail electric service. This Article examines the lessons
learned regarding the success of business structures in achieving the objective of ensuring nondiscriminatory access to
electric network, based on FERC's actions to restructure the
electric industry during the 1990s. To provide some context
for the measures that may be necessary to address potential
market power issues associated with the incumbent utility's
operation of the distribution platform, the Article also examines the actual experience with respect to one particular utility, the Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
("Con Edison"). Building upon the federal experience and
8.
9.

Id. at 48.
Restructuring: The Effects ofFERCOrders 888, 889, and2000, TRANSMISSIVES,
https://transmissives.com/the-story-of-the-grid/restructuring-the-effects-offerc-orders-888-889-and-2000/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2016).
10. Id.; see a/so infra text accompanying notes 113-35, 146-52.
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informed by an awareness of the local distribution utility's
ability to exercise market power, this Article concludes with
a recommended approach for the utility business model that
mirrors the approach ultimately adopted by FERC in the
wholesale transmission markets: an independent distribution
system platform operator, or IDSO.

1.

The Distribution System Platform Model

In its April 2014 order instituting the REV proceeding, the
New York PSC indicated its intention to consider "fundamental changes in the manner in which utilities provide service" and the possibility of a "substantial transformation" of
the utility business model." A key question to be addressed
would focus on the role of the incumbent retail electric
utility in a system geared toward integration of distributed
generation ("DG") resources and customer-centered load
management practices, with the goal of achieving greater
efficiencies in the system.12 The PSC identified six policy
objectives to guide the proceeding: providing better information and more tools to customers to manage their energy
bills; stimulating the market and "leveraging" the contributions from utility ratepayers; improving the efficiency of the
utility system; achieving greater diversity in energy resources;
improving the reliability and resilience of the utility grid;
and reducing greenhouse gas ("GHG") emissions. 13 Given
the "foundational steps" that New York has previously taken
to encourage the integration of DG resources into the utility grid and the presence of a single-state wholesale market
administered by the New York ISO, the PSC concluded that
New York was "particularly well-suited" to take the lead in
the examination of possible new utility business models.
The REV Order also recognized the changes in ratemaking
practices that must accompany any transformation of the
utility business model."
The REV Orderestablished two parallel tracks for the proceeding-one to examine the utility business model, and the
second to examine the regulatory framework and ratemaking
issues.1 6 The proceeding attracted an unprecedented number
of parties-259 stakeholders have intervened in the case-1 7
as well as considerable national attention." One commenter
11.

See N.Y. Pub. Serv.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

0101, at 4-5 (Apr. 25, 2014) [hereinafter REV ORDER], http://documents.dps.
ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld={9CF883CB-E8F1-4887B218-99DC329DB311}.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 4-5.
REv ORDER, supra note 11, at 6.

17.

N.Y.

Pub. Serv.

Comm'n, Order Instituting Proceeding,

No.

14-M-

Comm'n, Developing the REV Market in New York:

DPS Staff Straw Proposal on Track One Issues, No. 14-M-0101 (Aug. 22,
2014)

[hereinafter TRACK ONE PROPOSAL],

http://documents.dps.ny.gov/

public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld={CA26764A-09C8-46BF-9CF6F5215F63EF62}.
18.

See Gargi Chakrabarty, REVIt Up in New York, ENERGY CENTRAL (Aug. 25,
2014), http://www.energybiz.com/magazine/article/368385/rev-it-new-york;
Stephen Lacey, New York' Energy Czar: We Need Clean Energy Markets, Not
Programsor Mandates, GREENTECH MEDIA (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/new-york-energy-czar-we-need-clean-energymarkets-not-programs; Matthew Wald, State Energy PlanWouldAlter New York

Utilities, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/05/
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referred to REV as a "landmark regulatory proceeding" the
outcome of which "will reverberate across the country" as
other states wrestle with the same underlying drivers." In
addition to the Staff Report and Proposal issued with the
REV Order, Staff issued its proposal with respect to Track
One issues on August 22, 2014.20
In its Report and Proposal accompanying the REV Order,
the PSC Staff articulated a new business model for the electric distribution system that identified the foundational utility service as a "distribution system platform provider," or
DSP.21 As described in the Report and Proposal, this entity
would be charged, among other things, with planning and
designing its distribution system to facilitate a prominent
role for DG resources in meeting system needS 22 ; creating
markets, tariffs and operations systems to facilitate integration of "behind-the-meter" resource providers, such as
energy efficiency and DR programs, building management
systems, and microgridS 23 ; providing information technology and real-time pricing information among market participants, including pricing structures for DG products and
serviceS24 ; serving as the primary interface among retail customers in distribution markets and between retail customers
and the wholesale markets (i.e., aggregating products for the
purpose of offering them to the New York ISO)25; serving
as the local balancing authority (i.e., balancing loads and
resources to meet customer needs and maintain reliability) 26 ;

and developing communications networks capable of supporting a smart grid. 2 7 An issue to be explored in Track One
of REV was the identity of the DSP: in other words, would
the incumbent utilities be charged with operating the distribution platform under the new regulatory regime designed
in the REV proceeding, or were there other options, such
as having an independent, third-party operate the platform?
II.

Who Serves as Operator of the Utility
Network?

FERC explored essentially the same issue in the 1990s when
it undertook to introduce competition into the generation
market by requiring utilities to make the transmission grid
available to others and provide "open access" to non-utilities
to transmit their electricity over utility-owned transmission
lines. 28 Under the historical business model, the typical vertically integrated utility served all three functions-generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity-and its
nyregion/state-energy-plan-would-alter-new-york-utilities.html?_r=0.
19. Ryan Katofsky & Lisa Frantzis, DevilIs in the Details on NY' Reforming the Energy Vision, ADVANCED ENERGY ECONOMY (Sept. 11, 2014, 10:54 AM), http://
blog.aee.net/devil-is-in-the-details-on-nys-reforming-the-energy-vision.
20. TRACK ONE PROPOSAL, supra note 17.
21. Id. at 3.
22. Id. at 1, 12.
23. REV ORDER supra note 11, at 12.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 22.
27. Id. at 23.
28. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, Order No. RM95-8-000, 60 Fed. Reg.
17,662-01 (Apr. 7, 1995) [hereinafter OPEN ACCESS NOPR].
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transmission lines were typically used only to transmit, or
"wheel," its own power from its generating plants-often
located hundreds of miles away from its customer load-to its
own retail customers. 29 If this transmission grid was treated
more like an interstate highway system, however, and opened
up for use by others to wheel electrons over long distances,
then competition in the generation market would thrive,
thereby resulting in lower electricity costs at the wholesale
level that ultimately would translate into lower rates for consumers. 3 0 Sellers of electricity-the merchant power plants
that were being built as a result of earlier federal initiativeswould have access to a greater number of buyers, and the
retail utility "buyers" seeking wholesale power to serve their
customers would have access to a greater number of sellers. 3 1
But the success of this strategy depended upon the transmission-owning utilities granting non-discriminatory access
to the grid: what regulatory measures would be necessary to
ensure that the transmission-owning utilities would not discriminate against competing electricity suppliers in the terms
and conditions under which access would be granted to their
transmission lines? This is the issue that FERC addressed in
its Open Access NOPR, discussed in the next section.
Strikingly similar issues are involved at the retail level
under the distribution platform model articulated by the
New York PSC Staff under its DSP proposal. In a sense, the
utility network-in this case the retail distribution platform
rather than the wholesale transmission grid-is "opened up"
for use by others-in this case, DERs and energy efficiency
service providers, rather than merchant power plants and
other non-transmission owners-with an objective of achieving lower energy costs, and a more efficient use of electric
utility assets, for the benefit of retail customers. But the success depends upon the owners of the distribution platform
granting non-discriminatory access to that platform, and not
engaging in conduct that provides a competitive advantage
to themselves or their affiliates. Following an examination
of FERC's decision in Order 888 regarding the regulatory
approach for granting access to the transmission grid, this
Article will consider the approach adopted in New York with
respect to operation of the distribution platform. 32

A.

FERC's First Solution: The Incumbent Utility, With
Functional Unbundling

FERC examined similar issues in its restructuring of the
electric wholesale markets when it issued its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("NOPR") in April 1995 in its "open
access" proceeding, 33 which ultimately led to the issuance
of Order 888 in 1996 opening up the electric transmission
system to competition. 34 The objective of that proceeding
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 17,668.
Id. at 17,675.
Id. at 17,676.
See discussion infra Sections IIB, IILA, III.C.
Id. at 17,675-76.

34.

Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory

Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 75 FERC 1 61,080 (1996) [hereinafter
ORDER 888], https://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/1and-docs/rm95-8-00w.
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was removing impediments to competition in the wholesale
power markets, and FERC identified "market power through
the control of transmission" as the "single greatest impediment to competition."3 5 According to findings in the Open
Access NOPR, transmission service is a natural monopoly,
and transmitting utilities own the transmission system necessary to facilitate bulk power transactions.3 6 The owner or
controller of transmission facilities has the ability to exclude
generation competitors from the market, and thereby favor
their own generation.3 7 The exclusion can occur by denying
transmission access, or providing access only on rates, terms
or conditions of service that are discriminatory.38 Specifically,
FERC found that:
[U]tilities owning or controlling transmission facilities possess substantial market power; that, as profit maximizing
firms, they have and will continue to exercise that market
power in order to maintain and increase market share, and
will thus deny their wholesale customers access to competitively priced electric generation; and that these unduly discriminatory practices will deny customers the substantial
benefits of lower electricity prices."
The solution, according to FERC, was to require all public utilities owning or controlling transmission facilities to
offer open, fair and non-discriminatory access to the transmission grid.40
Citing circumstances strikingly similar to today's situation in the retail distribution system, FERC referred to the
industry as "in transition," and in the process of responding to changes in law, technology, and markets."1 FERC
acknowledged that while the move to competitive markets
in generation would "fundamentally change long-standing
regulatory relationships," the transition to competitive bulk
power markets would ultimately fulfill the Commission's
goal of encouraging lower electricity rates.4 2
In the Open Access NOPR and in Order 888, FERC identified three possible approaches to address the issue of transmission market power by public utilities. One approach
would turn over management of the transmission grid to
independent system operators, or ISOs.43 Under this model,
ownership would be separated from operation: While utilities may continue to own transmission assets, the regional
transmission organizations ("RTOs") or independent system
operators operate the grid. This would ensure that the transmission owners have no ability to leverage their monopoly
power in the transportation market-by virtue of ownership
of the transmission network-to advantage their positions in
the commodity or power market, through anticompetitive,
or discriminatory, practices regarding access to the grid.

A second approach considered by FERC was ownership
unbundling (i.e., requiring separation of transmission functions through creation of a separate corporate affiliate, or
selling off assets to a non-affiliate (divestiture))." Under the
ownership unbundling model, the operation of the electricity
network would be effectively separated from generation and
retail activities." In other words, the previously common ownership structure between network operations and generation
activities of a company are separated, including the separation
of asset ownership. 6 The separate transmission company that
is created not only operates, but owns, the transmission network assets. 7 Generation companies would be precluded from
acquiring or maintaining transmission networks."
An example of an "ownership unbundled" approach for
transmission is the independent transmission system operator, or ITSO, where one legal entity both owns and operates the transmission system." One such entity is National
Grid in the United Kingdom, which owns and operates the
national transmission network. 0 In addition to the system
operator in the UK, there are three transmission operators
charged with developing, operating, and maintaining the
transmission grid within defined regions: National Grid
Electricity Transmission plc in England and Wales, Scottish Power Transmission Limited for southern Scotland, and
Scottish Hydro-Electric Transmission plc for northern Scotland and the Scottish islands."
The third approach considered by FERC was functional
unbundling, or requiring utilities to separate wholesale generation and transmission services without formal changes in
legal ownership or corporate structure.5 2 In its Open Access
NOPR and Order 888, FERC determined that functional
unbundling could accomplish the objective of achieving
non-discriminatory open access to the transmission system.53 FERC defined functional unbundling to have three
elements. First, the public utility must take transmission services-and related ancillary services, such as scheduling and
balancing-for its own needs under the same tariff under
which others take such services. 4 In other words, the utility
charges itself the same price for those services that it charges
its wholesale transmission customers." The second element
was a requirement that rates for transmission and ancillary
services must be unbundled, or separately stated. 6 The third
44. Id. at 60-61; see aso OPEN ACCESS NOPR, supra note 28, at 17,681.
45. Neelie Kroes, Improving Competition in European Energy Markets Trough Ef-

fective Unbundling, 31

FORDHAM INTL L.J. 1387, 1424-25 (2007).

46. Id. at 1425.
47. Id.
48.

Id.

49. Michael Pollitt, Lessons From the History ofIndependent System Operatorsin the
Energy Sector, 47 ENERGY POLICY 32, 32-33 (2012).
What We Do in the Electricity Industry, NATIONAL GRID, http://www2.nationalgrid.com/uk/our-company/electricity (last visited Sept. 12, 2016).
51. Electricity, he GB Electricity Transmission Network, OFF. OF GAS & ELECTRICITY MKTS., https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/transmission-networks/gbelectricity-transmission-network (last visited Sept. 12, 2016).
52. ORDER 888, supra note 34, at 58.
53. OPEN ACCESS NOPR, supra note 28, at 17,681; ORDER 888, supra note 34, at
50.

txt.

35.

OPEN ACCESS NOPR, supranote 28, at 17,664.

36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 17,665.
Id.
Id.
Id.

40.

OPEN ACCESS NOPR, supranote 28, at 17,665.

41. Id. at 17,663.
42. Id.
43.

ORDER 888, supra note 34, at 56-61.
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54. See OPEN ACCESS NOPR, supra note 28, at 17,681.

55. See id.
56. See id.
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element was that the utility must rely on the same electronic network as its transmission customers when it seeks
to obtain information about transmission availability for
purposes of buying and selling power.1 7 Apart from these
three elements, FERC imposed a strong code of conduct
regarding communications between a utility's merchant
function of buying and selling of power and transmission operations." The code of conduct proposed by FERC
required that employees in transmission system functions
be separated from those in wholesale marketing functions,
and also defined permissible and impermissible contacts
between these groups of employees."
In Order 888, FERC determined that functional unbundling was a "reasonable and workable means" of addressing
the issue of non-discriminatory access, and declined to adopt
the "more intrusive and potentially more costly mechanism"
of ownership or corporate unbundling.60 While Order 888
accommodates corporate unbundling, it does not require
it." FERC concluded in Order 888 that corporate unbundling would create inefficiencies and additional costs, which
was unnecessary given its conclusion that functional unbundling would be sufficient to remedy discriminatory practices.62 Order 888 therefore rejected corporate unbundling as a
more intrusive and potentially more costly mechanism."63
It also rejected "operational unbundling," which refers
to the use of a third-party independent system operator,
although it encouraged utilities to consider ISOs "as a tool
to meet the demands of a competitive marketplace."" As
discussed in a later section of this Article, FERC ultimately
revisited this determination in Order 2000, where it extensively discussed the failures of functional unbundling to
achieve the desired goals and moved toward the ISO model
as the best means of ensuring nondiscriminatory access to
the transmission grid. 5

B.

New York's Current Solution: The Incumbent Utility,
With Functional Unbundling

In New York's REV proceeding, the DPS Staff endorsed
a functional unbundling approach in its "Straw Proposal
57. See id. Order 889, issued April 24, 1996, required an Open Access Same Time
Information System, or OASIS, to fulfill this third element of functional unbundling. See Open Access Same- Time Information System (formerly Real- Time
Information Networks) and Standards of Conduct, 75 FERC 1 61,078 (1996)
(codified at 18 C.ER. pt. 37), http://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/landdocs/rm95-9-00k.txt.
58. See ORDER 888, supranote 34, at 59.

59. See id.
60. Id.
61.
62.

See id. at 60.
See id. at 54. FERC acknowledged in ORDER 888 that a number of commenters strongly advocated for corporate or ownership unbundling. See ORDER 888, supra note 34, at 56-58. One commenter noted the affiliate abuses
that were occurring in the natural gas industry, and claimed that the potential
was even greater in the electric industry given the domination by vertically
integrated utilities. See id. at 55. Another commenter criticized functional unbundling as insufficient, as it would fail to address the ability of the utility to
favor its marketing operations when dealing with issues related to transmission
planning, capital investment, and O&M replacement costs. See id.

63.
64.
65.

Id. at 59.
Id. at 60, 61.
See discussion infa Section II.C.
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on Track One Issues." 66 As noted above, Staff defined the
Distribution System Platform, or DSP, model in its April
2014 report.6 7 In its Track One Proposal, Staff recommended
that the incumbent distribution utility perform the DSP
function, accompanied by additional measures to address
"the natural monopoly of distribution system operations"
and to "prevent the unfair exercise of market power by
utilities."6 Staff concluded that there were significant advantages to this structure inasmuch as the utilities already bear
the responsibility for the important function of maintaining
grid reliability, and the regulatory mechanisms are already
in place for the incumbent utilities, including ratemaking,
audits and operational review. 70
With respect to the issue of market power, the Track
One Proposal cited the utility's "direct commercial market involvement" with DG resources as a source of market
power, given the utility's control of (1) schedule and dispatch
of these resources, (2) their ability to interconnect with the
distribution platform, and (3) their access to system and customer data.7 1 As a result, the utility could erect barriers to
the ability of DG resources to compete, such as through burdensome interconnection requirements, inadequate tariffs,
or denial of access to system or customer data.72 The Track
One Proposalalso referred to the possibility of a "functional
competitive advantage" of the platform operator, irrespective
of utility behavior. 73
To address these market power concerns, the Track One
Proposalrecommended generally that utilities not be permitted to engage directly in ownership of DG resources, unless
the location of generation or storage is on utility distribution
property.74 While acknowledging that there are advantages
to having utilities involved in DG resources-they know the
needs and capabilities of the distribution system, and can
easily identify the best sites for locating DG resources-the
Track One Proposalconcluded that allowing utility participation could have the effect of discouraging private capital and
potential market participants from investing in New York,
thereby stifling the possible growth of a competitive and
innovative market for DG resources.75 The Track One Proposal recommended that utilities be permitted to participate
directly in sponsorship and management of energy efficiency
programs. 76 Where an unregulated utility affiliate seeks to
operate within the utility's service territory, codes of conduct
would govern the interactions with the regulated utility.7 7 In
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

TRACK ONE PROPOSAL, supra note

17.

See REV ORDER, supra note 11, at 9 attach. 1.
TRACK ONE PROPOSAL, supra note 17, at 12.
Id. at 18-19.

Id.
Id. at 67.
Id.
TRACK ONE PROPOSAL, supra note 17, at 67.
Id. at 72. The TRACK ONE PROPOSAL would allow

direct participation in lim-

ited circumstances, if part of a utility's Distributed System Implementation
Plans, and upon a showing that the proposal addresses a substantial system
need, the benefits of utility engagement outweigh the market power concerns,
and a competitive solicitation is used for construction and operation of DG
resources. Id. at 72-73.
75. Id. at 70.
76. Id. at 72.
77. TRACK ONE PROPOSAL, supra note 17, at 73.
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addition, regulatory scrutiny would be heightened to include
monitoring of interconnection complaints and the availability of an ombudsman for DG providers.78 If an affiliate bids
into a utility's procurement for DG resource, an independent entity would select the winning bids.79 Finally, caps on
market share would be placed on the extent of affiliate participation within the service territory and within individual
distribution circuits.so
The Track One Proposalin New York's REV proceeding
rejected the recommendation to establish an independent
DSP operator." The Proposal acknowledged several advantages to the independent DSP operator, such as the ability
to establish uniform; statewide practices, in contrast to the
DSPs operated by individual utilities; and avoidance of market power concerns and issues regarding utility ownership
of DG resources.82 Moreover, an independent DSP operator
was acknowledged as perhaps being more effective at stimulating technological innovation.83 But the Track One Proposal
also identified "numerous drawbacks" to an independent
DSP operator, including the addition of significant redundant costs given that the DSP would perform many of the
functions currently performed by utilities, and the addition
of duplicative functions at the DSP with respect to the system planning and operations functions of the utilities." The
Track One Proposal concluded that use of an independent
DSP operator approach would be an "expensive, unwieldy,
and incomplete response."8

In its Track One Order," the New York PSC adopted
Staff's recommendation to require the incumbent utilities
to serve as DSPs, finding that such an approach would be
"in the best interests of New York consumers." 7 In rejecting
an independent DSP approach, the PSC cited a lack of "evidence or compelling rationale" that separating the utility's
planning, grid operations, and market operations functions
at the distribution level would produce improved results."
According to the Track One Order, many of the services that
would be performed by an independent DSP are already performed by utilities, and the investment and operating costs
of an independent DSP would ultimately be flowed through
to retail customers." Customers would see "no value" from
these increased costs, according to the Order.0 To address
concerns raised by the parties regarding the ability of the
utilities in the role of DSP to exercise market power and
suppress innovation, the PSC adopted several market structures." First, it adopted Staff's recommendation to preclude
the utilities from owning DERs where the market is capable
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 19.
TRACK ONE] PROPOSAL, supra note 17, at 19.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 48.
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of providing such services.92 Second, the PSC indicated that
its ratemaking reforms from Track Two would provide utilities with the proper financial incentives to promote the success of REV markets rather than seeking to expand their rate
base investments as under the traditional utility ratemaking model.93 Third, the PSC committed to closely monitor
the performance of utilities as DSPs, using its numerous
regulatory tools for monitoring and enforcing DSP requirements." Fourth, the PSC proposed to address DSP activities that deter DER investments through a dispute resolution
mechanism that would expedite review and action on such
activities.9 5 Fifth, the PSC indicated that it would continue
to consider those proposals for functionally separating DSP
functions from standard utility operations, so long as such
separation does not interfere with efficient performance of
utility functions or impose unnecessary costs.9' Finally, the
Track One Order held out the possibility that entities other
than the utility could assume the DSP functions in the event
the utilities fail to meet the performance expectations with
respect to achieving REV objectives, although such a separation "is neither the preferred nor most economic approach."9 7

C.

FERC's Ultimate Solution: An Independent System
Operator

As noted above, FERC's Order 888 was intended to promote
competition in the wholesale electricity markets by removing impediments arising largely from the exercise of market
power by transmission owners over the interstate transmission grid.9' In addition to requiring all public utilities owning
or controlling transmission facilities to offer open, fair, and
non-discriminatory access to the transmission grid, Order
888 attempted to deal with the market power issue by requiring functional unbundling.99 The functional unbundling
requirements included, among other things, the separation of
transmission system functions and staffs within a public utility from wholesale generation marketing functions and staff,
and abiding by codes of conduct that defined impermissible
contacts between transmission and generation personnel. 00
Within four years, however, FERC issued its Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking on Regional Transmission Organizations ("RTO NOPR"), and concluded that functional
unbundling had largely failed to achieve the goal of eliminating opportunities for transmission owners to unduly discriminate in the operation of their transmission systems in order
to favor the power marketing activities of their affiliates.' As
stated in the RTO NOPR, "there are indications that contin92. TRACK ONE
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.

ORDER, supra note

6,

at

52.

96. Id.

97.
98.

ONE ORDER, supra note 6, at 52.
ORDER 888, supra note 34.
OPEN ACCESS NOPR, supra note 28, at 17681; ORDER 888, supra note 34, at
TRACK

TRACK ONE ORDER, supra note 6, at 48.

99.

Id. at 50.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 51-53.

60.
100. Regional Transmission Organizations, Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 64 Fed.
Reg. 31,390 (1999) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter RTO NOPR].
101. Id. at 31,397.
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ued discrimination in the provision of transmission services
by vertically integrated utilities may .

.

. be impeding fully

competitive electricity markets." 1 0 2 The next section of this
Article describes in more detail the bases for FERC's abandonment of the functional unbundling model.103
In its Order 2000, issued six months later, FERC adopted
a final rule that required public utilities to make various filings geared toward the formation of regional transmission
organizations.10 4 Because such organizations included "minimum characteristics" requiring their independence from
transmission owners, FERC determined that RTOs could
remove remaining opportunities for discriminatory transmission practices.1 05 And, in contrast to the heavy policing
required under functional unbundling, FERC expressed the
view that "a properly structured RTO would reduce the need
for Commission oversight and scrutiny," thereby benefitting
both FERC and the industry.106 Because the RTO would be
independent of any power marketing interests, FERC would
no longer be required to monitor and enforce compliance
with standards of conduct to preserve the fair playing field
under the functional unbundling approach. 10 7
Ill.

Lessons Learned From the Federal
Experience

In its RTO NOPR, FERC discussed the continuing barriers to a competitive wholesale electric market associated with
transmission access, notwithstanding the measures it put in
place three years earlier through Order 888.os FERC grouped
these barriers into two broad categories: (1) engineering and
economic inefficiencies, and (2) continuing opportunities
for transmission owners to engage in discriminatory conduct in the operation of their transmission systems in order
to provide a competitive advantage to their own or affiliated merchant operations.0 ' The latter category is of more
relevance to this Article, and includes findings that directly
bear on the design of the DSP model. These findings relate
to: (1) the inherent conflicts given the economic self-interest
of the owners of the utility network to provide an advantage
for their own power marketing interests over competitors1 o
(2) the extensive regulatory oversight and administrative burdens associated with enforcing compliance with standards of
conduct11 ; and (3) the importance of a transparent and fair
102. Id. at 31,391.
103. See discussion infra Section III.A.
104. Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, 89 FERC 161,285, at 2
(1999) (codified at 18 C.ER. pt. 35) [hereinafter ORDER 2000], http://www.
ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-docs/RM99-2A.pdf.
105. Id. at 3. ORDER 2000 requires that all RTOs be independent of any market
participants. Id. at 152. Independence is satisfied by (1) the RTO, its employees, and any non-stakeholder directors not having any financial interest in any
market participants; (2) the RTO having a decision-making process that is
independent of control by any market participant; and (3) the RTO having
exclusive and independent authority to file changes to its transmission tariff
with FERC. Id. at 152-53.
106. ORDER 2000, supra note 104, at 96.
107. Id.
108. RTO NOPR, supra note 100, at 31,397.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 31,402.
111. Id. at 31,403.
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framework to attract new competitors and create a robust
market that will benefit consumers.112 Many of the parties to
the New York PSC's REV proceeding raised the same issues
in their comments on the Track One Proposal. These findings and comments are discussed in greater detail in the sections that follow.

A.

The Inherent Conflict of Interest

In its RTO NOPR, FERC acknowledged that utilities exercising monopoly power over transmission facilities-and also
having power marketing interests-have "poor incentives" to
provide adequate transmission services to their power marketing competitors and, in fact, utilities have an economic
motivation to frustrate their competitors and provide an
advantage to their own power marketing operations.113 Fundamentally, functional unbundling did nothing to change
these incentives, but attempted to minimize the ability of the
transmission-owning utilities to act on those incentives. 1
FERC proceeded to identify the continued discriminatory
conduct by transmission owners that represent remaining
impediments to competition, which included the pattern of
transmission owners to understate the available transmission
capacity on paths valuable to competitors, or to divert capacity so that it is available for use by affiliated power marketing
interests' 15 ; violations of standards of conduct, which indicate a failure of functional separation'16 ; discrimination in
implementing line loading relief 1 7 ; and Open Access Same
Time Information System ("OASIS") sites that are difficult
to use.118
A number of parties in the REV proceeding in New York
raised similar concerns in the context of the Track One Proposalto have the incumbent utilities perform the role of DSP.
Jon Wellinghoff and 38 North Solutions, LLC, for example,
cited the "inherent conflict" between the owners of the distribution platform and the entities seeking to interconnect with
or use that platform, with the consequence that DERs will
fail to realize "their full operational and market potential."1
Walmart, for its part, claimed that allowing the incumbent
utility to serve as the DSP would result in the "re-monopolization of competitive markets and opportunities" and
the emergence of "monopoly-related inefficiencies." 120 The
Retail Energy Supply Association stated that allowing the
DSP function to be served by the incumbent utilities would
tilt the marketplace heavily in favor of the utility, given its
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
RTO NOPR, supra note 100, at 31,402.
Id.
Id. at 31,403.
Id. at 31,405-06.
Id. at 31,406.
RTO NOPR, supra note 100, at 31,406.

119. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Jon Wellinghoff et al., Comments of Jon Wellinghoff, Stoel Rives, LLC and Katherine Hamilton and Jeffrey Cramer, 38 North

Solutions, LLC, No. 14-M-0101, at 8 (Sept. 22, 2014) [hereinafter Wellinghoff Comments],

http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.

aspx?DocRefld={458FA6AD-3C38-4C70-8AAA-1ADC3EBD7CO3}.
120. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Walmart, Comments of Walmart, No. 14-M-0101,

at 3 (July 18, 2014), http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld={365293C6-FAD8-4C39-8370-86E6CAF5B2B7}.
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monopoly power and ability to recover its costs in rates.121
Environmental Defense Fund expressed the concern that the
incumbent utilities would tend to invest in traditional transmission and distribution ("T&D") facilities to address peak
demand growth rather than devote resources to stimulating
DER markets through which third parties could satisfy system needs. 122 Some parties in particular took issue with the
"for-profit" nature of the incumbent utilities, as compared
with the non-profit status of independent system operators
under the federal RTO model; according to Hudson River
Sloop Clearwater, Inc., the incumbent utilities owe their
"ultimate allegiance" to their shareholders, thereby resulting
in a "primary motive" to maximize profit. 123 Similarly, Infinite Energy, Inc. claimed that utilities as DSPs would foster
only those market activities that "ultimately benefit[] their
bottom line." 12 4

B.

The "Regulatory Police" and Codes of Conduct

The RTO NOPR also expressed concern about the "extensive
regulatory oversight and administrative burdens" associated
with enforcement of the standards of conduct. 125 On this
point, the RTO NOPR states:
[A] system that attempts to control behavior that is motivated by economic self-interest through the use of standards
of conduct will require constant and extensive policing. This
kind of regulation goes beyond traditional price regulation
and forces us to regulate very detailed aspects of internal
company policy and communication. For functional unbundling to be successful, we have to be concerned, in some
sense, about 'who spoke to whom' in the company cafeteria.
Functional unbundling does not necessarily promote lighthanded regulation. It also imposes a cost on those entities
that have to comply with the standards of conduct who face
additional training and rules that create rigidities in their
internal management activities.126
Parties to New York's REV proceeding stressed the importance of strict enforcement of standards of conduct in order
to minimize or eliminate the ability of the incumbent utilities to exercise market power. Parties advocated for "strong
Commission oversight" to keep in check the "unfair exer-
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cise of market power," 127 and the need for "strict and standardized market rules," accompanied by periodic review of
the utilities' performance as DSP to "protect against anticompetitive behavior." 128 The New York Independent System Operator ("NYISO") recommended that the New York
PSC mirror the provisions of FERC's Standard of Conduct
for Transmission Providers into its rules that would govern
operation of the DSP by incumbent utilities. 12 9 These include
an "independent-functioning rule," that requires the separation of employees engaged in transmission and marketing
functions, and thereby seeks to prevent entities from providing advantages to their competitive business through their
provision of transmission service 30; and the "no-conduit"
rule, which similarly prevents marketing employees from
obtaining non-public information from sources within the
utility.131 The NYISO provided an example illustrating the
need for the "no-conduit" rule:
If the [DSP's] otherwise non-public distribution system
operating information was available to a DER owner/operator affiliated with the [DSP], the affiliated entity could use
that information to its advantage to ensure that it was utilized at the expense of non-affiliated DER owners/operators
that do not have the benefit of that information. 132
The Independent Power Producers of New York ("IPPNY")
also provided examples illustrating how utilities operating as
DSPs could favor the DERs of their affiliates to the disadvantage of competitors, such as through relatively more difficult
interconnection procedures for competitors, or scheduling
distribution outages in a manner that favors the DERs of its
affiliate over its competitors. 13 3 According to IPPNY:
Each step and each decision that the T&D utility undertakes as part of that coordination role has the potential for
an exercise of market power, benefitting and creating a competitive advantage for the DER owned by the T&D utility
[or its affiliate] over DER that is owned by a competitor.1 3 1
The comments of Clean Energy Advocates also emphasized the challenges of enforcing standards of conduct:

127. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, The Clean Coalition et al., Reply Comments
on New York State Department of Public Service Staff Straw Proposal on

121. Retail Energy Supply Ass'n, Comments of the Retail Energy Supply Ass'n,

No. 14-M-0101, at 5-6 (July 24, 2015), http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld={73D991DB-D9D5-425E-9261A2EB3D8D5DEE}.
122. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Envtl. Def. Fund, Initial Comments of Environmental

Defense

Fund Regarding Staff Proposal Distributed System

Implementation Plan Guidance, No. 14-M-0101, at 8-9 (Dec. 7, 2015),

Track One Issues, No. 14-M-0101, at 5 (Oct. 24, 2014), http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld={E90D885F4A84-4317-B628-47389F5CBC16}.
128. N.Y.

Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Wal-Mart

Stores,

Inc., Reply Comments on

DPS Staff Straw Proposal on Track One Issues, No. 14-M-0101, at 2, 3

(Oct. 24, 2014), http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.
aspx?DocRefld={A72527F7-FB7D-4E4E-ACC7-8A4D5C8F 1115}.
129. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Comments of New York

http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld=

Independent System Operator, Inc., No. 14-M-0101, at 7, 8 (July 18, 2014),

{9248D3B7-2D46-4234-81D2-CE0AD9676EAO}.
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123. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc., Developing the
REV Market in NewYork: DPS StaffStraw Proposal onTrack One Issue, No. 14-

M-0 101, at 8 (Aug. 22, 2014), http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/
ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld= {34 1B225C-8019-4859-B94D-E83EA39 1CFBD}.
124. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Infinite Energy, Comments of Infinite Energy, Inc.

on the DPS Staff Straw Proposal, No. 14-M-0101, at 3 (Sept. 22, 2014),
http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld=

{5657024B-1EC6-4D69-B1A4-BC4D4D36D38F}.
125. RTO NOPR, supra note 100, at 31,406.
126. Id. at 31,407.

{9858E199-C6E3-437A-B670-C60392EB7D8F}.
130. Id. at 7.
131. Id. at 8.

132. Id.
133. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Indep. Power Producers of N.Y., Comments
of Independent Power Producers of New York in Response to Track 1 and
Track 2 Questions, No. 14-M-0101, at 14-15 (July 18, 2014), http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld={5435EB30-
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Existing ISO/RTOs demonstrate that 'platforms'
quickly become so complicated that almost no oneexcept those operating the platform-knows what is
going on. Within this complexity, the opportunity for
'self-dealing' is enormous.13 5
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out any confidence in the regulatory framework in New
York, said IPPNY, investment will migrate to "states more
friendly to competition." 143 Infinite Energy commented that
the "impetus for innovative products and services" would
be lost if incumbent utilities "can both design the system
and then profit from its particular design."14 4 Finally, Direct

C.

Preserving the Integrity of the System to Attract
New Investment

The RTO NOPR also noted the implications of continued
allegations of discrimination by the transmission owners.
First, there is the challenge of detecting such conduct, the
inefficiency of the complaint process, and the insufficiency
of any penalties in providing a deterrence. 1 36 More fundamentally, the RTO NOPR expressed the concern that such
allegations represent a perception by market participants that
the market is not operating fairly, given that the integrated
utilities have the incentive and continued opportunity to discriminate.137 This fear of an unfair advantage may inhibit the
willingness of market participants to invest in the market,
thereby jeopardizing the development of robust competition. 1 38 As stated in the RTO NOPR, this "perception that
many entities that operate the transmission system cannot be
trusted is not a good foundation on which to build a competitive power market" in that it "creates needless uncertainty
and risk for new investments in generation." 1 39
A number of parties to New York's REV proceeding
similarly commented on the importance of inspiring confidence in the integrity of the regulatory framework in order
to attract new investment from non-utility parties. NRG
Energy, Inc., a significant participant in the competitive
power markets, expressed strong support for an independent
DSP, citing the broad use of an independent manager internationally.140 According to NRG, the Staff proposal favoring
incumbent utilities as the DSP fails to "appreciate[] the enormity of the challenge that faces investors trying to compete
against a fully-integrated monolithic utility."4 ' IPPNY, for
its part, claimed that the private investment necessary for
REV to succeed would be discouraged if utilities are able
to exploit their "asymmetric access to information." 4 2 With135. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Columbia Univ.'s Sabin Ctr. for Climate Change
Law et al., Response to New York State Department of Public Service Staff

Straw Proposal onTrack One Issues, No. 14-M-0101, at 17 (Sept. 22, 2014),
http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld=

136.
137.
138.
139.

48173952D-FOCE-4DE4-A469-E5A7839608AE}.
RTO NOPR, supra note 100, at 31,402-03.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 31,407.

140. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, NRG Energy, Inc., Response of NRG Energy, Inc. to
Motion of Consolidated Edison Solutions, Inc. to Reject a Portion of Comments
of NRG Energy, Inc. on Proposed Rulemaking Concerning New Electric Utility Demand Response Tariffs in Accordance With "Developing the REV Market
in New York: DPS Staff Straw Proposal on Track One Issues," No. 14-M-0101,

at 2 (Nov. 25, 2014), http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld= {590177DD-250E-4CEC-BCEC-8F62DDE1C6CF}.
141. Id.
142. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Indep. Power Producers of N.Y., Comments on
Proceeding on Motion of the Commission in Regard to Reforming the En-

ergy Vision, No. 14-M-0101, at 10 (Sept. 22, 2014), http://documents.
dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld={AF271B73-235D-

Energy stressed the need for "a substantial degree of structural separation" between a utility's DSP functions and its
other operations before third-party participants would have
any confidence that the DSP is providing services on a nondiscriminatory basis.145

D.

The Opportunity to Learn From the Experience at
the Federal Level

In many respects, the objectives of the New York PSC in
designing the new utility business model in the REV proceeding mirror the goals that FERC articulated in Orders
888 and 2000: Creation of a competitive, non-discriminatory operating platform that would attract new entrants into
the market, ultimately resulting in a more efficient utility
network and producing benefits to consumers in the form
of lower prices and an increased ability to manage energy
costs.

14 6

Unless the framework is designed correctly, however,

these objectives will not be achieved and these benefits will
not be captured. With its decision to allow the incumbent
utilities to serve as DSP, the New York PSC is clearly following FERC's path from the mid-1990s, when it issued its Open
Access NOPR and ultimately Order 888. But given FERC's
findings regarding the deficiencies of functional unbundling,
it is not clear that the New York PSC is taking full advantage
of lessons learned at the federal level as the REV proceeding
blazes the trail for the design of electricity markets at the
retail level.
With respect to FERC's finding regarding the inherent
conflict of interest, the Track One Order does nothing to
address this fundamental issue, other than to suggest that
the regulatory framework will be designed in a manner that
reward utilities for "doing the right thing," and utilities can
be expected to respond accordingly. Given the fiduciary
obligation of utilities to maximize profits for shareholders,
however, it is difficult to envision that regulatory framework
being sufficiently rigorous to overcome the understandable
motivation of the incumbent utilities to engage in behavior
that enhances its earnings and the returns of its affiliates.
While it is true that utilities will respond to the incentives
provided by the regulatory framework within which they
4B4D-B415-F4A830908E7F}.
143. Id. at 11.
144. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Infinite Energy, Inc., Comments of Inifinite Energy,
Inc. in Response to the Questions on Track 1 Policy Issues, No. 14-M-0101,

at 18 (Sept. 22, 2014), http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld={949BB04B-98D3-4F1A-A8AC-C216A9969F95}.
145. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Direct Energy Services, LLC & Direct Energy Business, LLC, Comments of Direct Energy on Staff Straw Proposal, No. 14-M-

0101, at 9 (Sept. 22, 2014), http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/
ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld={4D22C5EF-A140-4889-BE8A-F8AC1B8971B3}.
146. See TRACK ONE ORDER supra note 6, at 11-12; ORDER 888, supra note 34, at
3-4; ORDER 2000, supra note 104, at 2-3.
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operate, it is a daunting challenge to develop a framework
that effectively deals with the "inherent" conflict identified
by FERC in its RTO NOPR and by several parties in the
REV proceeding. 7
The tool available to regulators to deal with this inherent conflict, of course, is standards of conduct: enforce
the functional unbundling by putting rules in place that
ensure the incumbent utilities do not engage in anticompetitive behavior that unlevels the playing field. This is the
path the New York PSC is pursuing, with its commitment
to monitoring and enforcement, coupled with prompt dispute resolution solutions when the unavoidable disputes
arise regarding anticompetitive conduct by incumbent
utilities.' Yet compared to FERC, the New York PSC
lacks the resources and the technical expertise to perform
this "regulatory police" function, and seems doomed to
relearn-painfully, and at the expense of those entities
seeking to compete with the incumbent utilities and their
affiliates-the lessons from FERC's experience between
1996 and 1999, when it attempted to enforce its functional
unbundling approach in the wholesale markets. On this
point, the comments of the NYISO and IPPNY are on
point: it is nearly impossible to identify all the instances in
which that "inherent conflict" manifests itself in the form
of anticompetitive behavior by the incumbent utility." 9
Too many decisions are made behind closed doors based
on claims involving complex engineering solutions, and the
competitors lack the resources to challenge these abuses
when they occur. 10 The next section discusses the realized
potential for exercising market power at the retail level and
the difficulties of challenging those abuses, as illustrated by
Con Edison's performance with respect to customer-centric
energy solutions. Another group of parties to the REV proceeding expressed the concern well, noting that the experience in the wholesale markets shows that operation of
platforms "quickly becomes so complicated that almost no
one-except those operating the platform-knows what
is going on," thereby creating enormous opportunity for
self-dealing." Is it reasonable to think that the New York
PSC will be so much wiser in its design of the regulatory
framework, and so much more powerful in the resources it
can devote to enforcement, that the outcome experienced
in the wholesale transmission markets in the late 1990s can
somehow be avoided in the design and operation of the
retail distribution platform?
The answer will become apparent in the success of the
New York approach in attracting new players and additional
147. RTO NOPR, supranote 100 at 31,403; see, e.g., Wellinghoff Comments, supra
note 119, at 8.
148. TRACK ONE ORDER, supra note 6, at 52.
149. Id. at 27, 36.
150. Id. at 47, 133.
151. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Columbia Univ.'s Sabin Ctr. for Climate Change
et al., Comments of Columbia University's Sabin Center for Climate
Change Law, Environmental Advocates of New York, the Pace Energy and
Climate Center, the Sierra Club, and the Vermont Energy Investment Corporation (collectively, "Clean Energy Advocates"), No. 14-M-0101, at 17
(Sept. 22, 2014), http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.
aspx?DocRefld={8173952D-FOCE-4DE4-A469-E5A7839608AE}.
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investment in the retail electricity markets. In order to get
the "innovation sitting on the sidelines"1 5 2 into the game, it
is essential that the rules of the game be perceived as fair,
and that existing players do not have competitive advantages
by virtue of their monopoly power. If potential participants
in this retail distribution market perceive that the regulatory framework is not designed in a manner that provides
a level playing field, or lack confidence in the integrity of
that framework because enforcement is ineffective, they simply won't make the investment, and retail customers will be
denied the full benefits of the transformation that is underway in the electric utility industry.
IV.

The Exercise of Market Power at the
Distribution Level

As policymakers consider the options for a restructured distribution system, they should be mindful of the risks associated with the exercise of market power by the incumbent
distribution utilities striving to protect their traditional
business model, and the challenges of designing a regulatory framework that effectively neutralizes the "inherent
conflict" posed by the incumbent utilities serving as the
DSP. As noted by several parties in the REV proceeding, it
is nearly impossible to monitor each and every decision by
the DSP in its operation of the distribution platform, and to
detect the subtle ways in which the inherent conflict manifests itself in the operation of a utility system that, by its very
nature, is complex. Can the incumbent distribution utilities
be expected to fairly promote deployment of DG resources,
microgrids, energy efficiency and DR programs within their
service territories? Can the incumbent distribution utilities be
expected to act in the best interests of the end-use customers
in operating the distribution platform? Or, will the market
be distorted by anticompetitive behavior as the incumbent
distribution utilities act to protect their traditional business
model and revenue streams?
On this point, it is worth examining the track record of
Con Edison's operation of its distribution system prior to the
post-Superstorm Sandy rate proceeding, which ultimately
led to the New York PSC initiating the REV proceeding.1 53
Con Edison's performance with respect to (1) enabling DG
providers to operate within its service territory, (2) facilitating microgrid development, and (3) the promotion of energy
efficiency programs to customers within its service territory,
provides some insights into the possible inherent conflicts
associated with allowing the incumbent utilities to serve as
DSPs, and the measures that may be necessary to address
market power.

152. Richard Kauffman, Introductory Remarks at Albany Law School Symposium,
Shaping the FutureofEnergy 10 (2014), http://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.
nsf/Al1/6DB084A00222486285257CE10046E6F8?OpenDocument.
153. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Order Approving Electric, Gas and Steam Rate Plans in
Accord With Joint Proposal, No. 13-E-0030, at 63 n.47 (Feb. 21, 2014) [hereinafter CON EDISON ORDER], http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/
ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld= {1714AO9D-088F-4343-BF91-8DEA3685A6141.
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Facilitating Integration of DG Resources: The Case
Study of the Bank of America Tower

On the issue of encouraging the development of DG
resources within its service territory, the experience of one
particular project in Manhattan perhaps illustrates Con
Edison's strategy towards facilitating the integration of DG
resources. The Durst Organization successfully developed
the Bank of America Tower at One Bryant Park, a 55-story
building in midtown Manhattan with 2.1 million square
feet of office space that was completed in 2010.54 At the
time of its completion, it was the first skyscraper in North
America to receive the designation of LEED Platinum,"' and
was described by its developers as "among the most environmentally advanced skyscrapers in the world.""' The building
includes a 4.6 MW combined heat and power, or CHP, facility that provides most of the electricity for the building. 7
The heat produced by the natural-gas-fired turbines is used
to make steam, which in turn is used to heat the building
and the domestic water supply, and to operate an absorption
chiller for cooling." According to the Durst Organization, it
made a substantial investment in the CHP installation with
the hopes that the facility would demonstrate the viability of
DG resources.5
Con Edison provides both electric and natural gas service
to One Bryant Park. 16 0 Twice over a twelve-month period,
the Durst Organization had to seek relief from the New York
PSC in response to efforts by Con Edison to impose increased
charges for natural gas and electricity service at One Bryant
Park related to the CHP facility.16' As observed by the New

154. One Bryant Park, DURST ORG., http://www.durst.org/properties/one-bryantpark (last visited Sept. 10, 2016). The building is 55 stories tall, comprising
fifty-one floors of tenant space and four floors of mechanical space. Id.; see also
N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Petition for Declaratory Ruling of OBP Cogen LLC,
a Subsidiary of One Bryant Park LLC, No. 12-G-0389, at 1 (Sept. 5, 2012)
[hereinafter DECLARATORY RULING PETITION].
155. Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design, or LEED, is a designation
offered by the U.S. Green Building Council. U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL,
http://www.usgbc.org/leed (last visited Sept. 10, 2016). Projects are certified
on the basis of several areas relating to sustainability and, depending upon the
number of points earned, are eligible to receive one of four LEED rating levels;
Certified, Silver, Gold, and Platinum. Id.
156. One Bryant Park, supra note 154.
157. David Sokol et al., Learning to Live on Alternative Energy, McGRAw HILL
CONSTRUCTION CONTINUING ED. (Mar. 2008), http://construction.com/ce/
articles/0803edit-5.asp.
158. Id. Combined heat and power, also known as CHP or cogeneration, is a form
of distributed generation that captures the waste heat produced by the generation of electricity that would otherwise be wasted, and deploys it as useful
thermal energy. Combined Heat and Power (CHP) Partnership, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/chp/what-chp (last updated Dec.
10, 2015). In the case of One Bryant Park, the waste heat is used for steam to
heat the building and to drive absorption chillers for cooling. Sokol et al., supra
note 157.
159. DECLARATORY RULING PETITION, supra note 154, at 2.
160. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Pace Energy & ClimateCtr., Pre-FiledDirectTestimony of Thomas G. Bourgeois, No. 13-E-0030, at 21 (May 31, 2013) [hereinafter
BOURGEOIS 2013TESTIMONY], http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/

ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld={EB3 1C202-D787-4790-8A8E-E4D94C8767C7}.
161. Patrick McGeehan, Midtown Developer Accuses Con Ed of Overcharging, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/10/nyregion/con-edis-accused-of-overcharging-in-midtown-skyscraper.html?_r=1.
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York Times, "[iut is not easy being green and trying to keep
the electric company from raising your rates."162
In the case of natural gas service, the issue was the applicability of Con Edison's "Rider H," which had been developed
in response to a 2003 order from the New York PSC directing utilities to develop rate schedules that would foster development of natural gas-fired DG resources, including CHP. 16 3
Con Edison had applied Rider H to all gas supplied to the
CHP facility at One Bryant Place upon the unit being placed
into service on June 9, 2010.16 The result of the applicability
of Rider H was to produce a lower rate than would otherwise apply; the New York PSC found that a discounted rate
was warranted given that CHP units are less costly to serve
given the higher "load factor" associated with CHP facilities.' Over two years later, however, in August 2012 Con
Edison informed the Durst Organization that a portion of
the natural gas supplied to the CHP facility was ineligible for
service under Rider H, a change in position that would have
increased natural gas charges to One Bryant Park by $86,129
per year.16 6 Con Edison took the position that only the natural gas directly used to generate electricity was eligible for
the Rider H classification, to the exclusion of gas burned in
the heat recovery steam generator ("HSRG") used to provide
thermal energy for One Bryant Park. 16 7 The Durst Organization claimed that the availability of Rider H for the entire
gas load at the CHP facility "played a critical role" in its decision to incorporate the CHP installation at One Bryant Park,
and still plays an "important role" in continued operation of
that facility. It should be noted that New York Presbyterian
Hospital, a similarly situated customer that had developed a
CHP project in 2009, filed a letter in support of the Durst
Organization's petition. New York Presbyterian had also
received a notification from Con Edison in August 2012 that
Rider H would no longer be applied to gas used in the duct
burners at the hospital's CHP facility, a change that would
potentially increase its natural gas charges by $100,000 to
$200,000 annually, thereby denying the "efficiencies necessary to justify [its] investment in this project."1 6 1
The New York PSC ruled against Con Edison, finding
that One Bryant Park's CHP system was entitled to Rider H
rates for its entire load. 16 9 According to the PSC, the use of
162. Id.
163. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Declaratory Ruling on the Application of Rider
H Rates, No. 12-G-00389, at 2 (Mar. 18, 2013) [hereinafter DECLARATORY
ORDER],

http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?Doc

Refld={959DOF00-A2C8-4363-9CF3-07319E728146}

(referring

to N.Y.

Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Order Providing for Distributed Generation Gas Service

Classifications, No. 02-M-0515 (Apr. 24, 2003)).
164. DECLARATORY RULING PETITION, supra note 154, at 2.
165. DECLARATORY ORDER, supra note 163, at 6. CHP facilities tend to levelize the
load requirements between the winter and summer seasons by using the system
throughout the year, and thereby avoid the impacts costs associated with the
more common winter-only peak gas usage. Id. at 6-7. In this manner, CHP
applications produce "benefits to the entire gas system," thus justifying the
preferential rates under Rider H. Id. at 6.
166. DECLARATORY RULING PETITION, supra note 154, at 2-3.
167. DECLARATORY ORDER, supra note 163, at 4.
168. Id.; see N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, N.Y. Presbyterian Hosp., Petition of OBP Co-

gen Partners Regarding Con Edison Gas Tariff Rider H, No. 12-G-0389 (Nov.
5, 2012), http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?Doc

Refld={DE332162-C5DB-4F68-9CAF-30BEBE583B3D}.
169. DECLARATORY ORDER, supra note 163, at 7.
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the additional natural gas by the HSRG in a CHP unit produces a higher throughput and thus improves the economics
of serving such facilities, thereby justifying the lower rate. 170
The PSC ruled that the application of Rider H to CHP facilities providing both electricity and thermal energy was not
only consistent with the language in Con Edison's tariff, but
was also supportive of the PSC's "policy to support distributed generation technologies."1 7 1

The second dispute between the Durst Organization and
Con Edison regarding the CHP facility involved the calculation of contract demand charges for service to One Bryant
Park. 1 72 The issue was whether the contracted demand was
to be "net" of the output of the CHP facility, or calculated
according to the building's load irrespective of the generation
provided by the DG resource. 1 73 The Durst Organization
claimed that a Con Edison representative explicitly stated
that contact demand charges would be calculated using the
net customer load. 7 In May 2011, however, Con Edison
notified the Durst Organization that it would be subject to
$290,000 in contract demand penalties because the usage
at One Bryant Park for that month had exceeded the con17
tract demand established for the building."
In imposing
those charges, Con Edison elected to disregard the generation from the CHP facility at the time of the alleged
"exceedance."1 76 In an order issued in November 2011,
the New York PSC rejected Con Edison's tariff interpretation, and ruled that contract demand exceedances would
be based on the net registered demand.17 7 Con Edison was
directed to modify its tariff to make it clear that exceedances would be measured on the net registered demand.1 78
Upon resolution of the tariff interpretation by the PSC, Con
Edison cancelled the contested overcharges and the Durst
Organization withdrew its complaint.1 7 9
170. Id. at 6-7.
171. Id. at 2.

172. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, OBP Cogen LLC, Complaint of OBP Cogen LLC,
a Subsidiary of One Bryant Park LLC, Regarding Overcharges by Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., No. 11-E-06 10, at 1 (Nov. 9,
2011) [hereinafter DURST COMPLAINT], http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/
Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld={477281A6-B5AO-4409-ACE2-26FDE513CABC}. The contract demand charge is calculated by multiplying the contract demand-which is the customer's maximum potential demand from Con
Edison, as determined by the customer or by Con Edison-by the contract
demand rate charged by Con Edison. Id. at 3.

173. Id. at 4.
174. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, The Durst Org., Comments on Tariff Filing by
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. to Revise Provisions of
Standby Service for Retail Access, No. 11-E-0299, at 3 (Oct. 21, 2011),
http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld=

{3BE8C860-8126-48 10-B4F9-E23D6A6A6A03}.
175. DURST COMPLAINT, supra note 172, at 4.
176. Id. At the time of the alleged exceedance, One Bryant Park had a contract
demand of 12,000 kW, while the demand at the building reached 13,760 kW.
Id. at 4-5. The CHP facility, however, was producing 3,237 kW at the time,
and thus Con Edison was supplying only 10,539 kW, well below the contract
demand. Id. at 5.
177. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Order Approving Tariff Amendments With
Modifications, No. 11-E-0299, at 8-9 (Nov. 17, 2011), http://documents.
dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld={3175C595-1830-

4401-83E9-1B09E95A330E}.

These particular disputes may not be isolated instances.
The Durst Organization claimed in the natural gas billing
dispute that Con Edison's decision to adopt a revised interpretation of Rider H "appears to be part of a larger, troubling
pattern" by the utility to "create barriers to clean, economic
distributed generation."1 so A witness in the 2013 Con Edison
electric rate proceeding observed that such disputes between
a utility and DG developers not only has a "chilling effect"
on the development of DG resources within Con Edison's
service territory, but also increases perceived risks associated
with DG investments as it casts doubt upon the "longer-term
projections of economic benefits and costs" associated with
DG projects."' As stated by the witness, "[miost DG developers simply do not have the financial resources or 'staying
power' to do battle with Con Edison over questionable tariff
interpretations or disputed billing calculations."1 8 2

B.

Other Evidence Regarding Con Edison's Record on
Facilitating Integration of DG Resources

On the broader issue of promotion of DG resources within
its service territory, Con Edison's record was disconcerting.
One witness in Con Edison's 2013 rate case described the
level of DG penetration in Con Edison's service territory
as "unacceptably low."1 8 3 Several practices were cited as factors contributing to Con Edison's "failure ...
to accommodate DG within its service territory."' First, Con Edison

imposed "restrictive and unattractive terms and conditions"
for DG participation in its relevant program."' In Con Edison's 2009 general rate proceeding, Pace presented testimony
describing the "100% physical assurance" requirement that
Con Edison imposed on DG providers seeking to participate in its Targeted DSM program.18 6 This requirement was
frequently cited by CHP developers as "a significant barrier
to pursuing CHP installations within Con Edison's service
territory."" 7 As a result, Con Edison had no participation by
DG providers in its Targeted DSM program as of 2010." It
was only as part of the DG Collaborative Process convened at
the conclusion of the 2009 rate case that Con Edison considments.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld= {47728 1A6B5AO-4409-ACE2-26FDE513CABC}.
180. DECLARATORY RULING PETITION, supra note 154, at 9.
181. Id. at 23.
182. Id.
183. BOURGEOIs 2013 TESTIMONY, supra note 160, at 20.

184. Id.
185. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Pace Energy& Climate Ctr., Prefiled DirectTestimony

ofihomas G. Bourgeois, No. 09-E-0428, at 11-12 (Aug. 28, 2009) [hereinafter
BOURGEOIs 2009TESTIMONY], http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/

ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld={C8AO2A5 1-D2C3-4861-9839-3CFAAB10467E}.
186. Id. at 10-12. The effect of the 100% physical assurance requirement was either
the customer load had to be isolated from Con Edison's system and served by
the DG resource, or the customer had to have the capability to shed its load in
the event the DG resource failed. Id. at 11. Con Edison's Targeted DSM program was designed to offer incentives for demand-side measures (e.g., energy
efficiency or distributed generation) to be installed in those areas of its service
territory with capacity issues, in order to reduce the demand on the electric
system. Targeted Demand Side Management (DSM) Program, CON EDISON,

178. Id. at 9.

http://www.coned.com/energyefficiency/targetedDSM.asp

179. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, OBP Cogen LLC, Complaint of OBP Cogen

10, 2016).

LLC Against Concerning Overcharges by Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., No. 11-E-610, at 1 (Dec. 6, 2011), http://docu-
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187. BOURGEOIs 2009 TESTIMONY, supra note 185, at 12.

188. Id. at 10.

(last visited Sept.
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ered relaxing the 100% physical assurance requirement for
DG resources to participate in the program."'
Second, Con Edison consistently failed to invest in the necessary grid upgrades to accommodate DG resources."' Due
to increased reliability benefits-and the ability to quickly
"island" from the grid in the event of an outage-developers of DG resources prefer to have their units synchronously
interconnected with the utility grid."' Con Edison had a
policy, however, of not allowing any synchronous system to
be connected to its grid, due to concerns about fault currents and system equipment damage. 19 2 Upon undertaking
the necessary system upgrades, which are primarily circuit
breaker replacements, synchronous generation can be accommodated on Con Edison's system.1 93 Until such upgrades can
be completed, however, DG providers are required to bear
the costs of installing fault mitigation." An issue in recent
years was the pace at which Con Edison would undertake
the necessary system upgrades to accommodate synchronous
interconnection of DG resources to its system."' Prior to the
2013 general rate case, Con Edison had committed to a minimum of sixty circuit breaker replacements in substations, a
commitment that it was proposing to terminate as part of
that rate proceeding."' The consequences of the slow pace of
these system upgrades is apparent from maps of the distribution system provided by Con Edison, which in 2005 indicated that the mitigation investments would be completed by
2014, whereas the map as of 2013 showed that the mitigation
investments would not be fully in place until 2026.197 The
current map provided by Con Edison continues to show the
2026 end date for Westchester County upgrades" and 2024
for areas in Manhattan."' Testimony by Pace in the 2013
Con Edison electric rate case proposed that Con Edison be
required to maintain its commitment, and in fact accelerate
that commitment from a minimum of sixty per year to a

189. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 2010 Distributed Generation Collaborative Report, No. 09-E-048, at 4 (Nov. 2, 2010) [hereinafter
DG COLLABORATIVE REPORT], http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/
ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld={B73 1E2D5-83A9-4954-9F 15-694699915503}.
190. BOURGEOIS 2013 TESTIMONY, supra note 160, at 25-26.
191. Forester Media, Branching Out With CHP, FORESTER DAILY NEWS, Mar. 6,
2012, http://foresternetwork.com/daily/energy/branching-out-with-chp/.
192. Id.; Distributed Generation, Synchronous Generation, CON EDISON, http://
coned.com/dg/configurations/synchronous.asp (last visited Sept. 10, 2016).
193. Con Edison provides maps showing the availability of synchronous generation
placement, by region. See, e.g., Synchronous Generation PlacementAvailability
by Region, CON EDISON, http://www.coned.com/dg/configurations/maps.asp
(last visited Sept. 10, 2016).
194. Id.; DistributedGeneration, Synchronous Generation, supra note 192 ("The customer is responsible for tripping the generator intertie breaker and /or contactor and isolating the generator from the Companys distribution system in the
event of an electric fault and/or abnormal voltage/frequency condition."). The
solutions imposed on the DG providers are expensive, result in reduced efficiency in operation of the unit, and use considerable space, which is a valuable
commodity in New York City. BOURGEOIs 2013 TESTIMONY, supra note 160,
at 25.
195. Id. at 25-26.
196. Id. at 25. As an incentive, Con Edison was subject to a penalty of$100,000 per
breaker not achieved below the minimum target. Id.
197. Id. at 26.
198. Synchronous Generation PlacementAvailability by Region, Westchester County,
CON EDISON, http://coned.com/dg/images/maps/w.pdf (last updated June 1,
2016).
19 9. Id.

35

minimum of ninety per year.2 00 It should be noted that this
issue was addressed in the JointProposalfiledby the parties to
settle the 2013 electric rate case: Con Edison was required to
pay the cost of purchasing and installing fault current mitigation technology in those situations where an over-duty circuit breaker condition exists, or will exist with the addition
of DG resources to Con Edison's system, up to a cost of $3
million annually. 201

C.

Con Edison's Record on Microgrid Development

Con Edison also had a record of discouraging development
of microgrids within its service territory. 202 This issue was
explored as part of the DG Collaborative process following
the 2009 Con Edison electric rate case. 203 In the DG Collaborative Report, Con Edison took the position that for a
"campus" type interconnection (i.e., a microgrid), customers would be required to have a minimum of two additional
feeders, 20 4 and that generally a campus style interconnection
involving DG resources "is not the preferred method for
Con Edison and may be cost prohibitive for the customer." 2 05
In the 2013 Con Edison electric rate case, parties pressed
Con Edison on measures it could take to facilitate microgrid
development in its service territory, including "standardization of the process" by requiring Con Edison to develop a
generic template and expand the eligibility for the "campus
style" interconnection explored during the DG Collaborative process. 2 06 Additional recommendations involved
expanding interconnection and metering options and additional service offerings by Con Edison. 20 7 This issue was
ultimately addressed in the Joint Proposal agreed upon by
the parties in settling the 2013 electric rate case, in which
Con Edison agreed to consider elimination of the single
customer limitation in its tariff to expand availability to
microgrids. 208 Con Edison also agreed to file an implementation plan with respect to the development of microgrids
within its service territory.209

D.

Con Edison's Record on Promoting Energy

Efficiency
On the issue of energy efficiency, testimony in the 2013 Con
Edison rate case indicated that Con Edison was lagging

200. BOURGEOIs 2013 TESTIMONY, supra note 160, at 26.

201. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Joint Proposal, No.
13-E-0030, at 96 (Dec. 31, 2013) [hereinafter JOINT PROPOSAL], http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld={388 1B 1938115-4BAO-AO1A-B8D373D59726}.
202. DG COLLABORATIVE REPORT, supra note 189, at 27.

203. Id. at 11-14.
204. Con Edison's requirement is that each individual feeder would have to be capable of carrying the full load of the DG resource in the event the other feeders
fail, hence the "minimum of two additional feeders beyond that needed for
export" of the DG output. Id. at 12.
205. Id. at 13.
206. BOURGEOIs 2013 TESTIMONY, supra note 160, at 26.

207. Id.
208. JOINT PROPOSAL, supra note 201, at 97; CON EDISON ORDER Supra note 153,

at 70.
209. JOINT PROPOSAL, supranote 201, at 97.
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behind many of the other utilities in New York State with
respect to implementation of energy efficiency measures.210
For 2012, Con Edison had captured only 65% of the annual
savings target under the New York PSC's Energy Efficiency
Portfolio Standard ("EEPS").211 Other utilities in the state
performed substantially better: Central Hudson had 147%
of the target savings, National Grid was at 93% and New
York State Electric & Gas was at 87%.212 Collectively, the
utilities other than Con Edison, together with the New York
State Energy and Research Development Authority, captured
savings representing 74% of the annual savings target under
EEPS.2 13 For the preceding period under the EEPS program, October 2008 through December 2011, Con Edison
acquired only 228,652 MWh of its 378,693 MWh target,
which represents a shortfall of about 40%.214

E.

Observations Regarding Con Edison's Exercise of
Market Power

The experience described above with respect to Con Edison
demonstrates the potential risks associated with the incumbent electric distribution utility's continued role as DSP,
unless adequate measures can be put in place to minimize the
opportunities for anticompetitive behavior; alternatively, the
business model can be designed in a manner that eliminates
the motivation for any anticompetitive behavior. Con Edison's record with respect to promoting energy efficiency and
deployment of DG resources and microgrids in its service
territory demonstrates the lengths to which the incumbent
utility can go to defend its business model.21 5 Con Edison
operated its DSM programs in a way that, as a practical matter, excluded participation of DG resources, and modified
those restrictions only after pressure to do so as a result of a
thorough examination in a collaborative process.216 Of more
concern is Con Edison's consistent pattern of refusing to
make the necessary distribution system upgrades to accommodate the seamless interconnection of DG resources and to
capture the reliability benefits-to customers-of synchronous interconnection. 21 7 The costs of those upgrades were
recoverable in rates, and the failure of Con Edison to make
the necessary investment seems to be motivated by a refusal
to facilitate the integration of DG resources within its service
territory. Again, only after these practices were exposed in a
general rate proceeding was the behavior corrected, by forcing Con Edison to make the necessary upgrades. The same
holds true for microgrid development, where Con Edison's

210. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Pace Energy & Climate Ctr., Prefiled Direct Testi-

211.
212.
213.
214.

mony of Jackson Morris, No. 13-E-0030, at 10 (May 31, 2013), http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld= {81F2C4EBEE3C-4921-B0F5-C5F4C6E24EF3}.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.

215. TRACK ONE ORDER, supra note 6.
216. Demand Response Programs Details, CON EDISON, http://www.coned.com/
energyefficiency/demand-response-program-details.asp (last visited Aug. 7,

2016).
217. TRACK ONE ORDER, supra note 6.
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burdensome requirements for interconnection of microgrids
were exposed and ultimately addressed in a settlement term
requiring Con Edison to undertake necessary tariff revisions
and to develop an implementation plan focused on encouraging, rather than discouraging, microgrid development within
its service territory. 218

V.

Potential Solution: An Independent
System Operator for the Retail
Distribution Platform

As discussed above, FERC's ultimate solution in Order 2000
was to move to an independent system operator. 219 According to FERC, the independent RTO approach, by "cleanly
separating the control of transmission from power market
participants," would be effective in reducing opportunities
for unduly discriminatory conduct. 22 0 Because the RTO
would have no financial interest in any market participant-under the "minimum characteristic" requirement of
independence-and no power market participant would be
able to control an RTO, the economic incentive-as well as
the ability-of the transmission provider to engage in discriminatory practices would be eliminated. 221 This approach
would also eliminate the "mistrust" in current grid management, and thereby attract new participants in the generation
market inasmuch as the market will be perceived as more fair
and attractive for investment. 222 With the addition of more
participants, the market can be expected to be deeper and
more fluid. 2 2 3

Several parties to the REV proceeding proposed to replicate the federal solution by having a third-party independent
non-profit entity serve as the DSP. 224 A leading proponent of
this model, sometimes referred to as the Independent Distribution System Operator in the context of retail distribution
services, or IDSO, model, is Jon Wellinghoff. 225 In Wellinghoff's view, the traditional utility model is "increasingly out

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
ORDER 2000, supra note 104, at 90.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 92-93.
Id. at 93.

224. According to the TRACK ONE ORDER, supra note 6, App. A, the following parties expressed support for an independent DSP: Alliance for a Green Economy,
Citizens for Local Power, Clean Energy Organizations Collaborative (comprising Clean Coalition, Columbia University Sabin Center for Climate Change
Law, Environmental Advocates of New York, Nature Conservancy, New York
Public Interest Research Group, Pace Energy and Climate Center, and Solar
Energy Industries Association), Clean Energy Advocates (comprising Columbia University Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, Environmental Advocates of New York, New York Public Interest Research Group, Pace Energy and
Climate Center, Sierra Club and Vermont Energy Investment Corporation),
Direct Energy Services LLC, Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Independent
Power Producers of New York, Infinite Energy, John Wellinghoff, and 38
North Solutions, Northeast Clean Heat and Power Initiative, New York Independent System Operator, NRG Energy, Retail Energy Supply Association,
SolarCity, and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

225. Wellinghoff was Chairman of FERC from 2009 to 2013, and is currently
Chief Policy Officer for SolarCity. See San Mateo, SolarCity Appoints Jon
WellinghoffChiefPolicy Officer, PR NEWSWIRE (Apr. 7, 2016, 4:46 PM), http://
www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/solarcity-appoints-jon-wellinghoff-chief-

policy-officer-300248141 html.
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of sync" with current trends in the electricity markets and
the expanding penetration of DG resources.226 Wellinghoff's
approach starts with the perceived need for a fundamental
reform and a re-examination of the way that utilities recover
costs, based on identifying those services that are best delivered in a regulated monopoly environment versus those that
can be provided under competition.2 2 7 He concludes that the
solution is to let the utility continue to own the grid, while
an "objective and separate" IDSO would operate the distribution platform. 228 Under this model, the IDSO would be
responsible for the reliability of the distribution system and,
like the ISO at the wholesale level, would ensure open, fair,
and nondiscriminatory access to the distribution platform. 229
The IDSO would also be charged with developing necessary
market mechanisms and optimizing the deployment of DG
resources. 23 0 Unlike the wholesale ISO model, where the ISO
is regulated by FERC, the IDSO would be subject to the
231
jurisdiction of state PUCs.
The distribution utility would continue to be responsible
for maintaining the distribution platform, subject to traditional rate-of-return regulation by state PUCs, and would
thereby be permitted to earn a return on any additional investments in the distribution system. 23 2 The distribution utility
would also continue to maintain the customer relationship
with end users, including the billing function. 233 Under this
model, the distribution utility would benefit from having a
much simpler-and less risky-business model, more efficient cost recovery, and the ability of its unregulated affiliates
to offer competitive services (e.g., investing in DG resources)
in areas outside of its service territory. 23 4 Wellinghoff identifies the following benefits to the IDSO model: more effective
and efficient integration of DG resources, increased utilization of the existing grid, more opportunities for consumer
choice and participation, and stimulating the development
of a "[t]ransactive Energy Framework" that would accommodate commerce in energy services. 23 5
A drawback to the independent DSP, as identified by the
New York PSC in its Track One Order, is the extra cost associated with the additional entity.236 On this point, FERC suggested in its Order 2000 that the flexibility permitted in the
Order would allow the creation of "streamlined" organizational structures that need not be costly. 23 7 Given the number
of configurations possible for meeting the minimum characteristics, the admittedly high costs associated with formation
of existing ISOs and power exchanges may not be relevant,
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according to Order 2000.238 In contrast to formation costs,
FERC claims benefits from RTO formation of $2.4 billion to
$5.1 billion annually, which represents 1.1% to 2.4% of total
costs in the electric power industry. 239 There is considerable
evidence on the costs associated with operating some of the
existing RTOs. Seven RTOs currently operate in the U.S.ISO New England, MidContinent ISO, formerly known
as Midwest ISO, PJM Interconnection, Southwest Power
Pool, California ISO, New York ISO, and Electric Reliability Council of Texas. 2 40 The MidContinent ISO, the RTO
serving all or parts of 15 states in central U.S., 2 41 has 782
employees and an annual budget of $273 million. 2 4 2 PJM,
which is the RTO operating in the mid-Atlantic states, has
725 employees and an annual budget of $252 million.2 43 As
stated by one commentator, these costs are "non-trivial." 2 44
Moreover, this commentator expressed the concern that
ISOs are "simply bureaucracies that are not subject to any
effective cost regulation." 2 45 He points to the sharp increases
in ISO costs in the U.S. in recent years, and notes that the
number of employees at the Southwest Power Pool has grown
from 39 in 1998 to 131 in 2004 and 473 in 2010.246 A former PSC Commissioner in New York complained about the
absence of ratepayer participation in the process at RTOs,
and noted that the cost per New York resident for services
provided by the New York ISO is 41% higher than the same
figure for the PJM Interconnection. 2 47 In its comments in
the REV proceeding, NRG placed the cost of ISO operating
charges at less than $1 per MW, citing the NYISO's charge
of $0.956 per MWh. 2 48
VI.

Conclusion

The design of the business model for the "utility of the future"
must achieve a number of objectives. A foundational objective is a regulatory framework geared toward the provision of
238. Id.
239. Id. at 95-96.
240. U.S. GovT ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-987, ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING: FERC COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS To ANALYZE REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS' BENEFITS AND PERFORMANCE 3 (2008), http://www.
gao.gov/assets/290/281312.pdf.
241. Locations, MIDCONTINENT INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, INC., https://www.misoenergy.org/AboutUs/Locations/Pages/Locations.aspx (last visited July 18, 2016).
242. Michael Pollitt, Lessons From the History ofIndependent System Operatorsin the
Energy Sector, 47 ENERGY POL'Y 32, 37 (2012).
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mission 23 (July 15, 2010), http://www3.dps.ny.gov/pscweb/WebFileRoom.
nsf/ArticlesByCategory/FAECB2BAOACBDC4C85257767004810F4/$File/
SessionTranscript71510.pdP. In 2010, New Yorkers paid an average of $7.16
per person for New York ISO services, as compared with $5.24 per person for
ratepayers within the PJM Interconnection. Heather Haddon, "Power" of the

Purse, N.Y. POST (Apr. 10, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://nypost.com/2011/04/10/
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nondiscriminatory access to the distribution platform. The
current structure of the incumbent distribution utilities carries with it an "inherent conflict" and the ability of the utility
to exercise market power in the operation of the platform, to
the disadvantage of potential new entrants into the market.
Moreover, it is exceedingly difficult to uncover the subtle selfdealing that is likely to occur, given the complexities of operating a utility network and the limitations in the resources
that can be devoted to monitoring and enforcement. In the
case of Con Edison, for example, actual experience demonstrates a tendency to underinvest in those upgrades to the
distribution network that would facilitate competition from
DG providers, to operate DSM programs in a manner that
precludes participation by DG providers and fails to deliver
energy efficiency programs to help customers manage their
energy bills, to resist widespread deployment of microgrids
within its service territory, and to employ questionable tariff
interpretations in an effort to thwart the financial success of
DG facilities.
While functional unbundling has the advantage of being
the least disruptive to the existing utility model and potentially requiring fairly low transaction and transition costs,
FERC's experience with the restructuring of the wholesale
electricity markets in Order 888 and its ultimate decision
in Order 2000 to reject functional unbundling in favor of
independent, third-party system operators, suggests that
functional unbundling may avoid short-term pain but fail to
provide the long-term solution. A recurring theme in evaluating the deficiencies of functional unbundling is the failure
to address the underlying conflicts of interest associated with
the vertically integrated utility, and the very high compliance

costs, as regulators attempt to enforce codes of conduct in a
valiant effort to demonstrate to third-party providers that the
system is fair. The inability to make the fundamental case
that the rules of the game are fair will jeopardize the attraction of new entrants, and associated new investment, into the
energy markets. Actual experience suggests that the vertically
integrated model, coupled with functional unbundling, will
fail to attract the necessary investment to modernize the network, as utilities will be reluctant to make any investments
that enable additional competition in its affiliated lines of
business. Con Edison's track record with underinvesting in
distribution upgrades to accommodate synchronous interconnection is a good example of market power being used to
thwart competition.
The IDSO model is more effective at addressing the
inherent conflicts of interest under the vertically integrated
model. Moving to this model would require a more fundamental restructuring of the business, with attendant higher
transaction and transition costs, and it is understandable
that the New York PSC was reluctant in its Track One Order
to take that somewhat radical step. It is notable that the PSC
held out the possibility of revisiting this issue in the event
the track record of incumbent utilities serving as DSPs produces disappointing results. 249 A number of parties urged the
New York PSC to continue exploring the independent DSP
model, and to develop the framework for ultimately transitioning to that model. 25 0 This would be a prudent course of
action for the New York PSC to follow, as the compelling
evidence from FERC's experience with the wholesale transmission market shows that the ultimate solution will be an
independent DSP approach.
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of an Independent Distributed System Provider (IDSP) in the event the utilities fail to provide a functioning system that is equitable to all users."); The
Clean Coalition, supra note 127, at 5 (noting that the utility DSP planning
process "should be accompanied by a parallel planning process for the implementation of an independent DSP"); see aso N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Al1. for
Clean Energy N.Y., Response to Ruling Posing Questions on Selected Policy
Issues and Potential Outcomes Cases 14-M-0101 and 14-M-0094, No. 14-M0101, at 15 (July 18, 2014), http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/
ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld= {19DB9F48-1939-4A5F-807F-283100582422}
("One proposal that may have merit and should be evaluated as the REV
moves beyond its initial stages is the creation of an Independent Distribution
System Operator.").
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